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Abstract
In recent analyses of standard, single-universe, cosmology, it was pointed out
that specific assumptions regarding the distribution and motion of matter
must be made in order to set up the cosmological standard model with a
global time parameter. Relying on these results, we critically examine the no-
tion of time in the multiverse – and in particular the idea that some parts of
the multiverse are older than others. By focusing on the most elaborated mul-
tiverse proposal in cosmology, the inflationary multiverse, we identify three
problems for establishing a physically well-defined notion of global time; a
quantum problem, a collision problem and a fractal problem. The quantum
problem – and the closely related “cosmic measurement problem” – may even
undermine the idea that parts of the multiverse causally and temporally pre-
cede our universe.
1 Introduction
The idea of a multiverse has recently become quite popular in modern cosmology.
According to some multiverse scenarios, based e.g. on so-called chaotic inflation,
our universe is supposed to be just one inflating bubble in a much bigger and older
multiverse with each component expanding differently and having different physical
laws (see e.g. Linde 2004 and Guth 2007). In this and related versions, the multiverse
thus purports to reject the common wisdom regarding modern cosmology according
to which asking what was before the big bang is considered as meaningless as asking
what is north of the North Pole, see e.g. Hawking (1989, p. 69).
While the multiverse idea has been widely discussed (and criticized) e.g. in
connection with its apparent lack of empirical testability (see e.g. Carr and Ellis
2008) very few studies have addressed the more conceptual problems facing the
notion of a multiverse in cosmology.1 In this paper, we want to explore a little
discussed conceptual question about the multiverse: Does it include a sensible notion
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of time which allows us to speculate that it is not only much bigger but also much
older than our (local) universe? The answer to this question will obviously depend
both on what kind of multiverse is contemplated, and on how time is (or could
be) conceived in the specific multiverse proposal. In any case, the investigation of
the question is likely to contribute to a clarification of the conceptual foundation of
cosmology.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first review some earlier work which
shows that a relationist understanding of time (an interdependence between time,
matter and motion) is essential to the standard notion of cosmic time. Armed with
this clarification, we discuss possible ways to understand the claim that there are
older patches (than our universe) in the multiverse. After that we discuss the most
worked out version of the multiverse arising from the theory of inflation and question
whether the notion of time in this theory is applicable as a multiverse time. In the
closing section, we offer a few brief comments on other multiverse scenarios and note
that these are likely to be even worse off with regard to time than the inflationary
multiverse.2
2 Time in standard (single-universe) cosmology
In our earlier work we have defended a version of relationism which affirms that
time is necessarily associated with physical processes. More specifically, we argue in
favour of a ‘time-clock’ relation which asserts that time, in order to have a physical
basis, must be understood in relation to physical processes which act as ‘cores’ of
clocks (Rugh and Zinkernagel 2005, 2009, see also Zinkernagel 2008). In the cosmo-
logical context, the time-clock relation implies that a necessary physical condition
for interpreting the t parameter of the standard Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-
Walker (FLRW) model as cosmic time in some ‘epoch’ of the universe is the (at
least possible) existence of a physical process which can function as a core of a clock
in the ‘epoch’ in question.
There is a more direct route to relationism in cosmology which is independent
of the mentioned time-clock-relation (even if in conformity with it). In this regard,
we discuss in Rugh and Zinkernagel (2011) how the very set-up of the FLRW model
with a global time is closely linked to the motion, distribution and properties of
cosmic matter. In the following, we briefly review some key points of this discussion
which are necessary components of our analysis of time in the multiverse.
In relativity theory time depends on the choice of reference frame. Since, for a
universe, a reference frame cannot be given from the outside, such a frame has to
be “built up from within”, that is, in terms of the (material) constituents within
the universe. It is often assumed that the FLRW model may be derived just from
the cosmological principle. This principle states that the universe is spatially ho-
mogeneous and isotropic (on large scales). It is much less well known that another
2We explore the notion of time in both the universe and the multiverse in more detail in Rugh
and Zinkernagel (2013).
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assumption, called Weyl’s principle, is necessary in order to arrive at the FLRW
model and, in particular, its cosmic time parameter. Whereas the cosmological
principle imposes constraints on the distribution of the matter content of the uni-
verse, Weyl’s principle imposes constraints on the motion of the matter content.
Weyl’s principle (from 1923) says that the matter content is so well behaved that a
reference frame can be built up from it:
Weyl’s principle (in a general form): The world lines of ‘fundamental
particles’ form a spacetime-filling family of non-intersecting geodesics (a
congruence of geodesic world lines).
The importance of Weyl’s principle is that it provides a reference frame which
is physically based on an expanding ‘substratum’ of ‘fundamental particles’ (e.g.
galaxies or clusters of galaxies). In particular, if the (non-crossing) geodesic world
lines are required to be orthogonal to a series of space-like hypersurfaces, a comoving
reference frame is defined in which constant spatial coordinates are “carried by” the
fundamental particles (see figure 1 in section 3.1). The time coordinate is a cosmic
time which labels the series of hypersurfaces, and which may be taken as the proper
time along any of the particle world lines. We note that the congruence of world
lines is essential to the standard cosmological model since the symmetry constraints
of homogeneity and isotropy are imposed w.r.t. such a congruence (see e.g. Ellis
1999). Thus, Weyl’s principle is a precondition for the cosmological principle; the
former can be satisfied without the latter being satisfied but not vice versa.
2.1 Is the Weyl principle (always) satisfied in our universe?
There are several possible problems which may arise with the Weyl principle. First,
there is the question of whether particle trajectories are always well-defined (at all
times in cosmic history). Second, whether – if such well-defined trajectories cross – a
suitable averaging procedure exists for smoothing out these crossings. As regards the
latter problem, it is clear that Weyl’s principle cannot hold for ordinary galaxies as
they indeed may (and do) collide. Likewise with the more fundamental constituents
in earlier phases of the universe. Thus the fundamental world lines in the Weyl
principle must be some ‘average world lines’ associated with the average motion of
the fundamental particles over some coarse-grained scales (in order to “smooth out”
any crossings).3
Regarding the first problem of whether particle trajectories can at all be identi-
fied, the starting point is that the Weyl principle refers to a non-crossing family of
3There exist observationally based claims (e.g. Labini et al. 2009) that the matter distribution
is not homogeneous but instead fractal at intermediate scales at least up to distances of the order
∼ 100 Mpc. If this fractality extended to arbitrary large distance scales, there would be no scale
above which collisions could be averaged out. Moreover, there would be ‘holes’ on all scales so no
set of ‘average world lines’ could fill space-time (implying that no congruence could be formed),
and also a homogeneous universe could not be recovered. Thus, both the Weyl principle and the
cosmological principle – even in their ‘coarse grained’ versions – would be undermined (see Rugh
and Zinkernagel 2013).
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(fluid or particle) world lines. The notion of such lines refers to classical, or classi-
calized, particle-like behavior of the material constituents. This makes it difficult to
even formulate the Weyl principle (let alone decide whether it is satisfied) if some
period in cosmic history is reached (in a backward extrapolation from now) where
the ‘fundamental particles’ are to be described by wave-functions ψ(x, t) referring
to entangled quantum constituents. What is a ‘world line’ or a ‘particle trajectory’
then? Unless one can specify a clear meaning of non-intersecting trajectories in a
contemplated quantum ‘epoch’, it would seem that the very notion of cosmic time,
and hence the notion of ‘very early universe’ is compromised. This last problem
of identifying a Weyl substratum within a quantum description arises most clearly
on a “quantum fundamentalist” view according to which the material constituents
of the universe could be described exclusively in terms of quantum theory at some
early stage of the universe. As noted in Rugh and Zinkernagel (2011), there is still
no good answer to what may be called the “cosmic measurement problem” (how to
get classical structures from quantum constituents in a cosmological context), not
least because it is highly questionable whether decoherence is sufficient to explain
the building up of a Weyl substratum.
3 Time in the multiverse?
With the above considerations concerning time in standard cosmology, we are now
ready to tackle the question of time in the multiverse. More specifically, we ask
whether – and under which conditions – one is justified in contemplating the idea
that some parts of the multiverse are older than ours. There seem to be at least two
relevant ways to establish the possibility of older patches or bubbles:
1. Define some sort of a ‘multiverse’ (or ‘supercosmic’) time for the multiverse
which gives a definite time ordering of the patches (as in figure 2 below).
2. If this cannot be done, then try to extrapolate our ‘local’ cosmic time concept
back through our ‘local’ big bang.4
Either way, the overall conclusion from section 2 is that time is relational. Thus,
there is no freely flowing absolute and universal background time parameter so both
multiverse- and (the extrapolation of a) cosmic time need to be grounded in the
behavior of the constituents within the multiverse and the universe respectively.
The notion of a ‘multiverse’ covers a great many possibilities (see e.g. Carr 2007).
In order to address something relatively well-defined we shall in this short note
restrict ourselves to consider some particular case studies of inflationary multiverse
models which, in our assessment, seem to be models (1) in which the model builders
to some degree reflect upon – or even attempt to provide a physical underpinning
4A third and related possibility, which we shall discuss below, is to use proper time – or at least
a time order – (associated with a single world line) to extrapolate backwards even in cases where
no ‘local’ cosmic time can be defined.
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for – the time concepts employed; and (2) which are investigated and developed to
a degree that they have entered the contemporary standard literature on cosmology
with some claims of observational testability.5 The basic idea of the inflationary
multiverse is that of a background (inflating) de Sitter space in which local bubble
universes (where inflation quickly comes to an end in thermalization and particle
production) continuously form (see figure 2). In its simplest version, the inflationary
multiverse is driven by a single scalar field ϕ – the inflaton (which, at present, is
unrelated to any known particle physics), see e.g. Linde (2004).
3.1 Can a multiverse time be defined?
In this paper a main question concerns whether the Weyl principle is satisfied in
the multiverse. To motivate an initial doubt, consider figure 2, in which there does
not seem to be a multiverse with patches or bubbles obeying the Weyl principle (a
similar figure suggesting a multiverse time can be found in Guth 2007). Thus, there
is no immediate physical basis for a multiverse time (indicated in the figure) which
could order the patches.6
Figure 1: An idealized “Weyl substratum”.
The particle (e.g. galaxy) trajectories form a
congruence in an approximation where galax-
ies are seen as space-time filling particles of
a fluid. Figure from Narlikar (2002).
Figure 2: A multiverse consisting of bub-
ble universes arising from the chaotic infla-
tion model with a suggestive global multi-
verse “time” axis indicated on the left. Fig-
ure from Linde (1998).
By making the analogy between the idealized Weyl substratum (a congruence of
e.g. galaxy world-lines) in our universe (figure 1) and the picture of an infiltrated
network of bubbles in the realm of the inflationary multiverse (figure 2), it is assumed
that the bubble universes somehow play the role of the substratum. The only
5Note that there are other proposals for older structures than our universe – e.g. cyclic universes
(“temporal” multiverses). Some of these have been discussed (and their time concept criticized)
in Zinkernagel (2008).
6The colours in the (original version of the) figure represent different effective physical laws (or
constants) in the different bubble universes. This corresponds to a more complicated multiverse
model – with various scalar fields – than the one discussed below (which has only one scalar field
ϕ). In our view, however, this complication does not change the discussion to follow.
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alternative will be to assume that this substratum is constructed from the part
of the ϕ-field outside the bubbles. Either way, we see trouble. In the first case,
because the bubbles collide. In the second case because it is hard to construct
(Weyl) trajectories from the ϕ-field, e.g. due to quantum effects (see below).
The need to satisfy the Weyl principle does seem to be recognized in the mul-
tiverse literature. Thus, Vanchurin et al (2000) notes that “an inflating universe
can be locally [within a bubble] described using the synchronous coordinates ds2 =
dτ 2 − a2(x, τ)dx2”. They continue:
The lines of x = const in this [synchronous] metric are timelike geodesics
corresponding to the world lines of co-moving observers, and the coor-
dinate system is well defined as long as the geodesics do not cross. This
will start happening only after thermalization, when matter in some re-
gions will start collapsing as a result of gravitational instability. Hence,
the synchronous coordinates can be extended to the future well into the
thermalized region.
This amounts to the claim that there is a Weyl substratum (a ϕ-field) which al-
lows us to set up a synchronous coordinate system within a bubble (and it is within
a bubble that thermalization and particle production occur). A similar construction
seems to be applied in the global case, i.e. for the whole multiverse. Thus, Guth
(2007, p. 6820) remarks that one can construct “a Robertson-Walker coordinate
system while the model universe is still in the false vacuum (de Sitter) phase, before
any pocket universes have formed. One can then propagate this coordinate system
forward with a synchronous gauge condition”. However, even if the importance of
the Weyl principle is implicitly recognized by proponents of the inflationary multi-
verse, we see three step-wise related problems for this principle to be satisfied (and
hence for a multiverse time to be physically underpinned):
1. Are there well-defined trajectories in the multiverse?
2. If there are well-defined trajectories, are they non-crossing?
3. If they cross, can such crossing trajectories be “averaged out”?
We elaborate a bit on these questions in the following three subsections, and as
we shall see, the answers to them may well be no, no and no. This is due to what
one could call, respectively, the quantum problem, the collision problem and the
fractal problem.
1. Are there well-defined trajectories in the multiverse?
As mentioned in subsection 2.1, the assumption of a quantum nature of the material
(or otherwise) constituents of the universe makes it hard (or impossible) to associate
these with well-defined particle trajectories. And during inflation the only relevant
constituent of the universe is taken to be the inflaton field ϕ which – in the last
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analysis – is a quantum field. While the quantum-classical transition from quantum
fluctuations to classical density perturbations has been widely discussed (even if not
critically scrutinized, for an exception see e.g. Sudarsky 2011), this point – that the
ϕ field itself is a quantum field – is easily overlooked. For instance Linde writes after
describing the basic mechanism in chaotic inflation (the most simple inflation model)
which ends in the oscillations of the scalar field near the minimum of its potential
(p. 130 in Carr 2007): “As any rapidly oscillating classical field, it loses its energy
by creating pairs of elementary particles” (our emphasis). Despite the wording, this
is not a reconceptualization of the whole edifice of classical field theory! Linde is,
of course, well aware that it requires quantum fields to create particles, and that
the word ‘classical’ simply refers to the lowest order approximation in quantum field
theory. But, again, just like wave functions in non-relativistic quantum theory do
not give rise to physical motion (of a particle or wave) in space and time – without
assumptions solving the measurement problem – so quantum fields do not describe
moving elementary particles in space with well-defined trajectories.
If we assume that this ‘quantum problem’ could be properly dealt with, we would
then have a sufficiently classical (or classicalized) inflaton field ϕ. The existence of
such a field has been assumed (as a mere postulate) in the investigation of various
scalar field inflationary models since their inception in the early 1980s. The back-
ground space for the inflationary multiverse is de Sitter space in which no matter is
present (matter is only produced at the end of inflation inside the bubbles). Thus,
the multiverse has – as available ‘material’ to build up the reference frame from
within – only the inflaton field ϕ. From this inflaton field one should construct some
trajectories in order to satisfy the Weyl principle and thereby provide multiverse
time (de Sitter t) a physical underpinning.7 One way of getting (a congruence of)
non-crossing trajectories is to assume that the matter-energy content is in the form
of a perfect fluid since this implies a well-defined four-velocity (and hence a direc-
tion for a trajectory) at each point of the spacetime manifold. As described e.g.
by Krasinski (1997, p. 8) and Hobson et al. (2006, p. 432), a 4-velocity field of a
perfect fluid can be constructed from (the gradient of) a scalar field.8 However, as
we shall see in point 3 below, this may not be sufficient to satisfy the Weyl principle
due to the fractal structure of the inflationary multiverse.
7Greene (2012, p. 69) suggests that one may directly use the changing value of the ϕ field as a
clock (as measured by an “inflaton-meter”). He apparently assumes that the ϕ value is monoton-
ically decreasing in de Sitter t. This idea is similar to the standard use, in FLRW cosmology, of
matter density ρ, or the temperature T of the background radiation, as a clock, see e.g. discussions
in Rugh and Zinkernagel (2009). However, in our assessment, Greene’s clock cannot in general
trace the de Sitter t “time” parameter (and thus cannot provide a physical underpinning of it).
First because the (classical part of the) ϕ field may not be homogeneous in x-space (as in Linde’s
chaotic model) – and so the same ϕ value (an ‘equal ϕ hypersurface’) becomes associated with
different de Sitter t-values. And second because even an assumed homogeneously distributed ϕ
field will exhibit quantum fluctuations so that, again, the same ϕ value gets mixed up with different
t-values.
8The idea is to equate the energy momentum tensor of the perfect fluid form with the energy
momentum tensor for the scalar field. This results in the 4-velocity uµ = A · ∂µϕ where A =
(∂νϕ ∂νϕ)
−1/2.
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2. Could the trajectories be non-crossing?
If the relevant substratum for the Weyl principle in the (inflationary) multiverse
is the bubble- or pocket universes, there does indeed seem to be crossing of the
trajectories.9 For instance, Garriga, Guth and Vilenkin (2006) note:
A bubble universe nucleating in an eternally inflating false vacuum will
experience, in the course of its expansion, collisions with an infinite num-
ber of other bubbles.
Thus, bubble collisions do occur and so the Weyl principle is not satisfied at the
level of bubbles. This problem appears to be aggravated by the observation that
the inflationary multiverse seems to result in a fractal structure in which merging of
different thermalized domains (bubble universes) occurs on all scales (see e.g. Guth
2007 and Vanchurin et al 2000).
3. Could crossing trajectories be “averaged out”?
Even if bubbles collide, and so trajectories cross, it may still be possible – just as in
the single universe case – to devise an averaging procedure to “smooth out” these
crossings. However, this will be difficult in the realm of the inflationary multiverse
since it appears to be fractal (Guth 2007, p. 6816). This means, as far as we can
see, that there is no “cut off” scale above which the implementation of averaging
procedures will produce non-colliding world-line trajectories out of bubbles (which
collide below such a scale).
If the Weyl substratum is to be constructed from the ϕ field (outside the bubbles)
the situation seems no better since these regions outside the bubbles likewise appear
to form a fractal. This is suggested e.g. by the highly random and irregularly looking
distribution of the scalar field(s) in fig. 20.2 in Linde (2004, p. 435) and explicitly
stated in Vanchurin et al. (2000, p. 4): “...these [inflating] regions [outside the
bubbles] form a fractal of dimension d < 3”. Although this may not result in
collisions between trajectories constructed from the ϕ field, it nevertheless seems to
imply a problem concerning the averaging procedure. According to Guth (2007, p.
6816),
One does have to think about the fractal structure if one wants to un-
derstand the very large scale structure of the spacetime produced by
inflation.
We agree. But if one, indeed, thinks about exactly this, it appears that the fractal
structure of the inflationary multiverse results in a far more complicated large scale
spacetime structure than the highly symmetric Robertson-Walker spaces (which are
isotropic and homogeneous) employed in simplified inflationary modeling. More
fundamentally, in our assessment (and to be examined further), the Weyl principle
9If the substratum (the world-lines of which “carry” the coordinates) is not formed by the
bubble universes, but is rather to be found in the background de Sitter space with an inflaton field,
then we are either back in the subsection above or proceed to the subsection below.
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appears not to be satisfied: According to this principle, the reference frame is built
up from a space-time filling congruence of geodesics. This can at most be fulfilled in
a coarse grained (averaging) sense. However, due to the self-similar fractal structure
(of both the inflating and thermalized – bubble – regions) there is no possible coarse
graining scale above which a spacetime filling congruence can be constructed (as
there will be ‘holes’ at all scales). If this is so, the physical foundation for a global
de Sitter multiverse time appears insufficient.
3.2 Extrapolating our cosmic time, proper time or time or-
der back to an older bubble?
If the Weyl principle does not hold in the multiverse, there will be no global time
parameter which can be used to temporally order the bubble universes of different
‘branches’ in figure 2. But it would seem that, even without a Weyl principle, it
should still be possible to contemplate older structures than our universe by focusing
on a single (our own) ‘branch’ in the figure. Indeed, if we accept the idea that one
bubble universe can somehow causally give rise to another, then it appears possible
to consider other bubble universes (within our own ‘causal branch’) which predate
our universe. Nevertheless, as we shall indicate below, to contemplate this possibility
may be far from straightforward.
One way to address the causal past of our universe would be if we could ex-
trapolate our ‘local’ cosmic time concept further back than our (local) beginning.
Now, if this beginning is taken to be (arbitrarily close to) an initial singularity or,
alternatively, that it is located in some ‘epoch’ described by quantum gravity such a
proposal seems hopeless or, at best, highly speculative (see also Zinkernagel 2008).
Indeed, most cosmologists would agree that there is no (known) sensible time con-
cept “before” the Planck time (∼ 10−43s) and so no clear meaning can be ascribed
to instants earlier than that.
However, if the beginning of our universe occurs – as assumed in inflationary
multiverse models – at the beginning of the inflationary phase, then there may be no
need to extrapolate time either through a singularity or through a quantum gravity
epoch. Indeed, as long as some causal structure can be maintained (light cones
should not tilt more than 45◦), then it may be sensible to speak of the past of any
event. Thus, one may perhaps speculate, for instance, that before the beginning
of inflation at, say 10−35s, the universe no longer gets denser and hotter (as in
standard cosmology) but rather expands into a previous bubble universe. In fact,
such a suggestion may work even if the ‘local’ (in our universe) Weyl principle is
not satisfied in the inflationary epoch. For even if there is no cosmic time (no Weyl
principle) it could still be possible to ask about the past of any event – for instance,
the past of the onset of inflation. Specifically, we can address the past of an event
by extrapolating backwards proper time along a world-line which ends in the event.
Such a possibility appears to be implied when Tegmark (2005, p. 49) remarks (after
stating, as we saw Garriga, Guth and Vilenkin do above, that geodesics cross after
thermalization within a bubble):
9
When we discuss t [time] for a particle in the present epoch, the rigor-
ously inclined reader can simply take this to mean its proper time, since
this provides a well-defined ordering even after geodesic crossing. [our
inserts]
For this to be made into a workable suggestion for contemplating earlier bubbles
than our own, it must be possible to identify (or, at least, to speculate) a particle
world-line along which proper time can be extrapolated backwards.10 In particular,
photons – or other massless particles – alone will not be sufficient as they have no
past (i.e. their proper time is zero).11 Note that proper time along a specific world-
line will give a quantitative measure of time differences between events. But since
we are here only interested in the notion of earlier bubbles, a time (or chronological)
order will be sufficient. Thus, the existence of any time-like curve (on which we can
address proper times τ < τ0, where τ0 is the beginning of our bubble) will suffice.
In the inflationary scenario, the relevant candidate for a particle world-line (a
time-like curve) will have to come from the ϕ field. However, as discussed in section
2.1. and 3.1.1, there is a ‘quantum problem’ in constructing sensible notions of
particle world-lines and classical trajectories from the inflaton field. In particular, at
the supposed ‘birth’ of a new bubble universe, the inflaton field is strongly quantum:
Quantum fluctuations with amplitudes (within a factor of 10) of the order of the
Planck scale are necessary to reset or lift the scalar field back to a value where a
new bubble is born and becomes dominated by inflation (see e.g. Linde 2004, sect.
4).12 Thus, at the ‘birth’ of a new bubble universe, the ϕ field is nowhere close to
being a classical field on top of which we have small quantum fluctuations. Rather,
it is entirely dominated by Planck scale quantum fluctuations.
It is therefore unclear to us how one would go about constructing any individual
classical particle world-line from the inflationary scalar field ϕ in a regime where
its quantum behaviour is dominant. But if such world-lines (classical trajectories)
cannot be constructed from the underlying physics (the ϕ field), it seems, in our
assessment, that the very conditions for speaking about the past of an event in
general relativity are not fulfilled. We therefore tentatively conclude that this proper
time, or time order, route to contemplating earlier patches or bubbles (within a given
10From our relationist point of view – in which time is necessarily related to physical processes
(Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009) – the time-like curves can only be identified (they only have a physical
basis) if the motion of objects or test particles along these curves is at least in principle realizable
from the available physics.
11Within the framework of general relativity the notion of “causal order” depends on the con-
struction of “backwards light cones” based on the existence of time-like or null-like curves (see e.g.
Hawking and Ellis 1973, section 6 “Causal structure”) – and therefore on the notion of (possible)
classical particle or light-signal trajectories. The latter is insufficient to establish a chronological
ordering of bubbles since – if only light is present – causal influences are instantaneous (again,
photons have no past).
12Whereas Linde (2004) mostly discusses chaotic inflation, the quantum problem also shows up
in the multiverse model based on the “new inflation” scenario: It is hinted e.g. in Vilenkin (2004)
that within new inflation, the scalar field is dominated by its quantum behavior when new bubble
universes form (near the maximum of the inflaton potential).
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branch of bubbles) in the multiverse seems problematic.13
4 Outlook
In this note we have argued that it is very difficult to construct a global multiverse
time parameter (as suggested e.g. by Linde and Guth) which would give a temporal
ordering of different branches in the inflationary model of the multiverse (cf. figure
2). We have also indicated that it is not straightforward to maintain even a concept
of time order within a given branch of bubbles since, at the birth of a bubble, the
physics is entirely dominated by quantum fluctuations. This means that there is no
possibility to construct classical trajectories (from the inflaton field) on which the
causal and temporal structure in general relativity is based. Thus, it is difficult to
provide a physical underpinning of what one could mean by saying that some other
bubble universe predates our own.
Our discussion above applies only to the restricted class of (inflationary) multi-
verse models considered. As noted, these models appear to be the most elaborated
versions of the multiverse – in particular in terms of contemplated spatio-temporal
structure (e.g. the notion of a background de Sitter space). In any case, it seems to
us that it might even be more problematic to think of patches or bubbles ‘older’ than
ours if we consider more radical versions of the multiverse (for instance those con-
templated in Tegmark’s (2004) level III-IV). Such versions may include the notion
of completely disconnected regions and/or fundamentally different physical laws in
the different bubbles. This may well undermine (1) the causal structure needed to
define the past light-cone of an event and, in particular, the idea of extrapolating
proper time backwards to an earlier bubble; and (2) the possibility of comparing
the time concepts of – and thus temporally order – different bubbles (e.g. since, as
discussed in Rugh and Zinkernagel 2009, time is implicitly defined by laws). None of
this means that there could not be ways to contemplate a multiverse older than our
universe. But we would at least recommend that multiverse model builders ought
to be clear about what time concept they use.
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